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An Unconfined, Large-Volume Hydrogen/Air Explosion 
During the development of the
	 nuclear rocket, was that	 overpressure and
	 negative pressure
	 were 
an experiment was conducted to measure acoustic about	 3.4 and	 1.7	 kN/rn 2
 (0.5	 and	 0.25	 psi),	 re- 
sound levels during the release of hydrogen at high spectively.	 The	 photographs	 taken	 during	 the	 ex-
flow	 rates	 into	 the	 atmosphere.	 It	 was	 desirable plosion indicated a pressure-wave velocity of about 
to flow once with and once without the hydrogen 335 rn/sec (1100 ft/sec). 
flared	 in	 order to isolate combustion 	 noise from Calculations based on the physical size of the ex-
flow noise. It was recognized that hydrogen auto- plosion revealed that only about 90 kg (200 lb) or 10%, 
ignition might occur at any time, that such auto- of the hydrogen exploded. Evidently, this was attribut- 
ignition S would require experiment abort, and that able to the gas being too dilute, which was probably 
damage might result. Autoignition did in fact occur, promoted by the high discharge rate of the gas-
the	 experiment	 was	 aborted,	 and	 attention	 was 1.2 km/sec at 54 kg/sec (4000 ft/sec at 120 lb/see). 
diverted to studying the possible sources and docu- It- was- ­concluded that, in the release of a large .	
menting	 the	 damage that resulted from
	 the de- quantity	 of	 hydrogen	 into	 the	 atmosphere,	 auto-
flagration of 283 m
	 (10,000 ft 3 ) of gas. ignition would produce an "explosion" which could 
Autoignition	 of	 the	 hydrogen	 occurred	 during be described as a deflagration of explosive velocity, 
the shutdown	 portion	 of the unburned hydrogen with	 a shock	 wave of about sonic velocity,	 with 
run,	 as	 flow was
	 being	 reduced.	 Before the tests minor damage potential. This test constitutes the only 
began,	 three	 potential	 causes	 of autoignition	 were known 'measured observation of such a great volume 
recognized: of exploding	 hydrogen,	 and should	 be of interest 
(I) Electrification of the gas,
	
- to suppliers and users of the gas. 
(2) Electrification	 of the	 particles	 carried	 in	 the Note: 
gas, and Requests for further information may be directed 
(3) Incandescence of large particles, to: 
After	 the	 explosion,	 a	 fourth	 possibility -
	 and Technology Utilization Officer 
the	 one that appears most	 probable	 in	 this case AEC-NASA Space Nuclear Systems Office 
- was discovered. A metal rod that was welded U.S. Atomic Energy Commission
 
across the mouth of the nozzle through which the Washington, D.C. 20545
 
hydrogen was exhausted had torn loose at one end; Reference: TSP7 1-10041
 
the rending action may have been the ignition source. Patent status: 
The closest observers, 0.8 km (0.5 mi) away and in No patent action is contemplated by the AEC or 
the onen, detected no nressure wave Yet others I t km NASA.
(2 mi) away and in or near control point buildings
	
Source: R. Reider, H. J. Otway, and 
reported windows rattling. A shed 85.3 m (280 ft)
	 -	
-	 H. T. Knight of 
away was damaged, and the immediate area suf-
	
Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory 
fered widespread, superficial damage, most of which
	
under contract to 
appeared to have resulted from the negative phase
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of the shock wave. A reasonable engineering estimate
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